TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=93HT1059> <link 93XP0217> <title> 60 Election: The Backdown </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1960 Election </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> November 2, 1962 COLD WAR The Backdown </hdr> <body> "There was danger in standing still or moving forward. I thought it was the wisest policy to risk that which was incident to the latter course." -- James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (1822) Last week that perilous choice confronted another, younger President of the U.S. Generations to come may well count John Kennedy's resolve as one of the decisive moments of the 20th century. For Kennedy determined to move forward at whatever risk. And when faced by that determination, the bellicose Premier of the Soviet Union first wavered, then weaseled and finally backed down. Staggering Proof. To Kennedy, the time of truth arrived when he received sheaves of photographs taken during the preceding few days by U.S. reconnaissance planes over Cuba. They furnished staggering proof of a massive, breakneck buildup of Soviet missile power on Castro's island. Already poised were missiles capable of hurling a megaton each--or roughly 50 times the destructive power of the Hiroshima atomic bomb--at the U.S. Under construction were sites for launching five-megaton missiles. Into early October, the Soviets proceeded covertly, masking their operations with lies and claims that they were sending only "defensive" weapons to Cuba. Then they threw off stealth, lunging ahead in a frantic, scarcely concealed push to get offensive missiles up and ready to fire. Their aim was devastatingly obvious: they meant to present the U.S. with the accomplished fact of a deadly missile arsenal on Cuba. If the plan had worked--and it came fearfully close--Nikita Khrushchev would in one mighty stroke have changed the power balance of the cold war. Once again a foreign dictator had seemingly misread the character of the U.S. and of a U.S. President. At Vienna and later, Khrushchev had sized up Kennedy as a weakling, given to strong talk and timorous action. The U.S. itself, he told Poet Robert Frost, was "too liberal to fight." Now, in the Caribbean, he intended to prove his point. And Berlin would surely come next. The Decisions. Kennedy shattered those illusions. He did it with a series of dramatic decisions that swiftly brought the U.S. to a showdown not with Fidel Castro but with Khrushchev's own Soviet Union. Basic to those decisions were two propositions: -- It would not be enough for the Russians to halt missile shipments to Cuba. Instead, all missiles in Cuba must be dismantled and removed. If necessary, the U.S. would remove them by invasion. -- Any aggressive act from Cuba would be treated by the U.S. as an attack by the Soviet Union itself. And the U.S. would retaliate against Russia with the sudden and full force of its thermonuclear might. As a first step, and only as a first step, President Kennedy decided to impose a partial blockade, or quarantine, on Cuba, stopping all shipments of offensive weapons--ground-to-ground and air-to-ground missiles, warheads, missile launching equipment, bombers and bombs. When Kennedy first made known this plan, there were some complaints that it was not enough. But Kennedy meant it only to give Khrushchev an opportunity to think things over; more precipitant action by the U.S., Kennedy felt, might cause Khrushchev to lurch wildly into nuclear war. The decision to start with the quarantine also gave the U.S. time to rally support in Latin America and forestall criticism that Europeans might have directed at an immediate invasion. The Only Course. President Kennedy announced his decisions on television to a somber nation and found that nation overwhelmingly behind him. Perhaps David Heffernan, a Chicago school official who listened to the speech in a crowded hotel lobby, best expressed the American mood: "When it was over, you could feel the lifting of a great national frustration. Suddenly you could hold your head up." Political leaders of both parties swung swiftly behind Kennedy's Cuba policy. G.O.P. congressional leaders issued a joint statement saying: "Americans will support the President on the decision or decisions he makes for the security of our country." New York's Republican Senator Kenneth Keating, who had repeatedly criticized Kennedy for moving too slowly against Cuba, now said that the President's stand "will have the 100% backing of every American regardless of party." Declared ex-President Herbert Hoover: "There is only one course for the American people in this crisis of Communist aggression--to stand by the President." From the governments of the U.S.'s allies in NATO and SEATO too came strong, heartening assurances of support. Even more remarkable was the unanimity of the Latin American republics in endorsing the U.S. stand: at a Washington meeting of the Organization of American States, the delegates by a vote of 20 to 0 adopted a resolution calling for the "immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles." Against this surge of feeling, Khrushchev reacted hesitantly. Twelve hours after Kennedy's speech, the Kremlin issued a cautiously worded statement. Then Khrushchev sent a peace-rattling message to British Pacifist Bertrand Russell. Next, Khrushchev grasped eagerly at a suggestion by U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, for a two or three weeks "suspension," with Russia halting missile shipments to Cuba and Kennedy lifting the blockade. Kennedy politely declined, writing U Thant: "The existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons." But Khrushchev had one more trick up his sleeve. He offered to take his missile bases out of Cuba if the U.S. would dismantle its missile bases in Turkey. With a speed that must have bewildered Khrushchev, the President refused. That did it. Early Sunday morning came the word from Moscow Radio that Khrushchev had sent a new message to Kennedy. In it, Khrushchev complained about a U-2 flight over Russia on Oct. 28, groused about the continuing "violation" of Cuban airspace. But, he said, he had noted Kennedy's assurances that no invasion of Cuba would take place if all offensive weapons were removed. Hence, wrote Khrushchev, the Soviet Government has "issued a new order for the dismantling of the weapons, which you describe as offensive, their crating and returning to the Soviet Union." Finally, he offered to let United Nations representatives verify the removal of the missiles. If carried out, it was capitulation. Kennedy said he welcomed Khrushchev's decision. In his stand against Khrushchev, the President had not once missed sight of the central point: that the Soviet missile capability in Cuba was a threat to U.S. survival. By directly challenging Soviet aggression in the hemisphere, Kennedy was acting on the fundamental principle of the Monroe Doctrine. And he had given momentous meaning to the principle of moving forward. </body> </article> </text>